VALUE CHANGES AND «GENERATIONAL GAP»: THEIR INFLUENCE ON YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC POLICY

The world in which we are living now is full of rapid changes on a global scale, in the European, national and local community levels—one of the most crucial of which is the demographic factor. People are not only living longer, but with much higher probability will change traditional identities and their parent’s lifestyles, ways of working and interacting with others. Large inequalities in wealth and income, political instability and armed conflicts are the main drivers of global migration. Worldwide, the number of people living in countries other than their birth country has grown from 173 million in 2000, to 220 million in 2010 and up to 258 million in 2017 with the median age 39 years, from which about 78 million international migrants live in Europe (International Migration Report, 2017). Nevertheless, the most essential transformations are happening in the daily life of citizens—in the sphere of their eagerness to be a part of the society and its values or their refusal and fervour to look for better opportunities outside their country of birth.

Problem setting. The world in which we are living now is full of rapid changes on a global scale, in the European, national and local community levels—one of the most crucial of which is the demographic factor. People are not only living longer, but with much higher probability will change traditional identities and their parent’s lifestyles, ways of working and interacting with others. Large inequalities in wealth and income, political instability and armed conflicts are the main drivers of global migration. Worldwide, the number of people living in countries other than their birth country has grown from 173 million in 2000, to 220 million in 2010 and up to 258 million in 2017 with the median age 39 years, from which about 78 million international migrants live in Europe (International Migration Report, 2017). Nevertheless, the most essential transformations are happening in the daily life of citizens—in the sphere of their eagerness to be a part of the society and its values or their refusal and fervour to look for better opportunities outside their country of birth.

For the first time in history different generations are working side by side and closely both with people who are as young as their children and as old as their parents (Zemke, Raines, Filipczak, 2000). The impact of the «generational gap» within society and its influence on politics and policy changes in different generation cohorts in countries with western form of democracy became obvious in the 1960–70s. The first wave of international data collection of the World Values Survey (WVS–1981) indicated intergenerational value shift from traditional values of security to self-expression values, sufficient public interest and participation in political decision-making that took place during the 1950–70s. However, according to the scientific contribution of WVS these changes are far from universal and provide empirical descriptions of economically advanced countries with western forms of democracy, where the younger generations have experienced different formative conditions from those that had shaped the older generations (Inglehart, 2007).
Recent research and publications analysis. The most common tool for measuring value differences is through the WSV and European Values Study. WSV, which has been carried out since 1981 and now covers 90% of the world’s population confirmed formation of a new generation in the 1950–1970s that in common represents post-material values, looks for maximal self-expression, is sceptical of the government, religion and ideologies, is liable to trust democratic institutions, but not individuals and is sensitive to the environment and tolerant of ‘alternative lifestyles (e.g. homosexuals, asexuals, single mothers)’ (Hrytsak, 2015).

At the same time at the beginning of the millennium, such scholars as Z. Bauman, M. Castells, C. Doherty, O. O’Hea, J. Kiley, R. Putnam, P. Sztompka, F. Fukuyama, J. E. White and others became increasingly aware of the problem of values and erosion of traditional identities and the construction within generation cohorts of new types of local, national and virtual identities.

Among the Ukrainian scientists who examine age connections with changing value priorities are E. Afonin, O. Balakireva, Ju. Golovakha, O. Goncharenko, S. Hayduchenko, Ja. Hrycak, A. Kolodii, S. Kolyshko, O. Kondrashov, N. Lypovska, V. Martynenko, M. Parashchevich, T. Pechonchyk, I. Pys’mennyj, A. Ruchka and others. There are also such Ukrainian “think tanks” as the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, which conducted nationwide value surveys. Despite all the theoretical and data-based publications, the problem of «generational gap» in Ukraine, its influence on value change, on politics and policy making of different age cohorts still lacks sufficient understanding.

The paper objective – to examine influence of «generational gap» on value changes and the contemporary relations of different generations to politics and public policies.

The paper main body. The concept of generations started its history in the 1920–30s in Europe by François Mentréin France, Jose Ortega y Gasset and Julian Marias in Spain, and Karl Mannheim in Germany. According to K. Mannheim theory, which is considered to be the reference point for generational theory in the Anglo-European literature, the shape of future generations is significantly influenced by historical environments and shared by the group experience during their youth (Mannheim, 1952). After the Second World War two alternative approaches (a) cohort (based on demographics: age division, level of workforce and level of education, income level, population of school-age youth) and (b) generational (share of common interest: values, lifestyle, political), were developed in tandem within analyses of historical changes (Gilleard, Higgs, 2007).

In the late 1980s one of the most influential generational theories, known as the Fourth Turning theory, was proposed by William Strauss and Neil Howe. It describes recurring «generation cycle». According to Strauss and Howe «a generation is a group of people who share a time and space in history that lends them a collective person» (Strauss, Neil, 1992). From a sociological perspective, «generation» is: (a) a sequence of collectives; (b) a picture of historical phase in context of social change; (c) variable relations determining its typical institutions, which influence on economic success and political prerogatives, social mobility, migration, personal security, marriage and family roles. In the late 1990–2000s empirical descriptions of growing polarization among generations (so-called «age gap») were correlated with: (1) historical experience of different generation cohorts; (2) cultures of different generations and (3) structural inequalities between age groups (Vincent, 2005).

Values connect people in a group and effect on psychosocial motivation and behaviour of a person, her/his choice to identify her/himself with national, social and other kind of communities, and define the aim of society as a unity. At the same time, all these rapid changes had huge impact on every sphere of human life. In the eighteenth–nineteenth centuries the first industrial revolution (1IR) transformed European and American rural society to industrial and urban. Just before World War I the growth of steel and oil production coupled with massive usage of electric power forced a second industrial revolution (2IR). During the second half of twentieth century the majority of the labour force in «post-industrial» democratic societies had been employed in the service sector (D. Bell’s, 1974). Then in the 1980s came the Digital Revolution with computers, the internet, IT and communications technology. The 3IR is still ongoing but at the same time mass technological inventions are acting as the driver and catalyst for 4IR. 4IR or so-called «Industry 4.0» includes automation and data exchange, cyber-physical systems, the «internet of things», cloud computing and cognitive computing, which are transforming policies, societies, human activity and even the human body.

American sociologist R. Inglehart in his book «The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics» (1977) stresses two significant value transformations which took place during the 1950–70s in countries with stable democracies, such as: moving from vital to post-material values, a «shift» from traditional values of security to self-expression values, sufficient public interest and participation in political decision-making (Figure 1) (Inglehart, 2015, p. 4–5).
System-Level Changes:

1. Economic and technological development
   Satisfaction of sustenance needs for increasingly large proportion of population

2. Distinctive cohort experiences
   Absence of «total» war during past generation

3. Rising levels of education

4. Expansion of mass communication
   Penetration of mass media; increase in geographic mobility

Individual-Level Changes:

Values:

- Increasing emphasis on needs for belonging, esteem and self-realization

Skills:

- Increase in proportion of population having skills to cope with politics on national scale

System-Level Consequences:

1. Change in prevailing political issues; increasing salience of «life-style» issues

2. Change in social bases of political conflict; relative decline of social class conflict

3. Change in support for established national institutions; declining legitimacy of nation-state; rise of super-national and «tribal» loyalties

4. Change in prevailing types of political participation; decline of elite-directed political mobilization; rise of elite-challenging issue-oriented groups

Figure 1. (Inglehart, 2015, p. 5)

The Processes of Social and Political Values Changes, R. Inglehart (1977)

The main conclusion of the results is that the welfare of the population leads to democratization and modernization of social lifestyle. At the turn of the twentieth century, using further results from WVS (1995) for diagnosis of post-material priorities of Americans, Harvard professor Robert Putnam, figuratively speaking, confirms that unlike generation of the 1950–1970s Americans of the twenty first century prefer to play alone, withdrawing from public awareness, even if the game is a priori a group one (e.g. dinners, holidays and «bowling» alone) (Putnam, 2001). This way, it’s not only about the change of civic participation of Americans, but also about new types of social and political links between members of organizations in which their ties are to common symbols, common leaders and perhaps common ideals, but not to each other (Putnam, 2001, p. 52). During the last quarter of the twentieth century American society experienced a sharp change, not only from social and political activity, but from usual leisure time with family and friends.

The increase in indicators of students’ volunteering observed in the mid-1990s, according to Putnam, have been largely an effect of school-graduation policy of these years when social activity helped to raise chances for entrance to US colleges. Instead, further studies had shown that the emergence of the 9/11 attacks (terror attacks, 11 September 2001) had an impact on the civic conscience of new generation of Americans directly interested in social and political life of their country. According to the surveys between 1966 and 2008 the share of those aged 18 to 29 who avowed complete agreement with the claim that «it’s my duty as a citizen to always vote», rose by almost 50 percent after the 9/11 terror attacks, while during the same period, the comparable rate among those older than 30 stayed flat (Sander, Putnam, 2010, p. 11).

In his latest book «Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis» (2015) Putnam highlights the gradual loss of key value component of the American dream – equal opportunities for successful self-expression regardless of social background of a person. In other words, Putnam actualizes the problem of upward mobility and stresses gaping disparities for children from wealthy families and children from the most disadvantaged groups of American society. In recent decades, overall preparation and admission rate for US colleges increased, although the gap between students from rich and poor families in finishing college increased from 39 percentage points to 51 percentage points during the 1980–2000s (Putnam, 2001, p. 190). This negative trend is also reflected in the fact that youth from rich families, finishing school with middle or low-scoring, are more likely to get a college degree then poor teenagers with high test scores. Such situations involve the threat of potential conflicts inside young generation of Americans. According to Putnam, to avoid conflicts connected with increasing inequality and value-semantic gap between social groups government should start investment and implementing preventative public programs.
On the other hand, new social ties, which arise through communication in social networks, form new social movements outside the institutions of civil society (Castells, 2009). A virtual space can change the image of a human, her/his understanding of «the Self» and her/his place in the world. Regardless of one’s social status and location, new technologies give the opportunity for a person to become famous in seconds, to create a start-up or to gather people into a group for realizing their idea without leaving home. From this perspective, Smartphone Generation, often called Generation Z, will come to typify the new reality. The most significant cultural challenge in a new generation will be the post-Christian world, according to a survey of thirty-five thousand Americans by the Pew Research Center (White, 2017). In this context, revealing to American researches of generation value change, the Figure 2 reflects the main aspects of the «generation gap» in values influencing on working skills.

![Figure 2. Source: Ernst & Young (Persona, 2013) Generation gap according to US respondents who agree each generation displays the following characteristics, June 2013, % (born from)](image)

In 2009 Inglehart together with Pippa Norris published the book «Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World», where they argued that globally, societies have experienced a cosmopolitan flood of information from diverse channels originating beyond local communities and national borders (Norris, Inglehart, 2009). These new living conditions endanger cultural diversity and, according to the new research titled «Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations Are Changing, and Reshaping the Worlds», which is based on six waves of WVS from 1981 to 2014 and was published in 2018, it could provide a step-back from the democratic institutions of the twentieth century to increasing authoritarianism, political populism and in some countries a large increase in religiosity (Inglehart, 2018). Representative cases of such tendencies could be the example of ex-communist countries: sixteen of the 22 countries of the former communist regime show increased religiosity, and all six (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the three Baltic countries) made relatively smooth transitions to market economics and are now the members of EU and NATO. Poland has the most extreme tendency to become more religious than all other countries (Inglehart, 2018, p. 70–71). From the other side, it is the clear rise of populist politics in these counties (especially Poland) and the related rise of authoritarians (Hungary, for instance) and their turning away of migrants.

Revealing this tendency could be the answer one of WVS questions: How interested would you say you are in politics? During two decades at the end of the 20th – 21st centuries the share of interest in political life in most Western European countries has fallen to 30–50 % of the total population. According to the data of a study of the entire period the only exception was Germany, where the East German population had shown the maximum rate of interest in politics during the period of German reunification. After 1990, the rates of German interest in politics in Germany fell some 20 %, but still are the highest among all the European Union member-countries and remains close to the US rates. Table 1 presents summary data for the representative states to compare them with the results of the Ukraine surveys between 1990 and 2004 (Halman, Inglehart, 2008, p.156) and between 2011 and 2013 (WSV, Wave 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1990, %</th>
<th>1995, %</th>
<th>2000, %</th>
<th>Change in 10 years, %</th>
<th>2011/2013, %</th>
<th>Change in 10 years, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belorussia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fed.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-9</td>
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During the dissolution of the Soviet Union Baltic countries, – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
showed extremely high interest in political life, but afterwards the rates became close to most of the other EU states. In Ukraine during the years 1995–2000 interest in politics was in the middle rate, compared with the European average rates, but lower than in neighbouring Belarus and Poland. Compared to the first years of Independence, the overall trend shows a significant disappointment of Ukrainians in the politics of their country. Ukrainians were interested in political life 6–7% more than Russians in 1995–2000, but in 2011 the rates of both of the countries were the same. The rate of interest in politics also differs by age and gender. According to WVS in Ukraine among 35% of men and 31% of women were interested in politics in 2011. The share of interest in political life among those aged younger than 30 and aged 30 to 39 was almost the same in both groups – about 25%. The highest rate was among those older than 50 years (WVS, Wave 6), – Wave 7 of WSV results is still in process.

In Ukraine youth is quite a heterogeneous social group in age, education level, as well as in social and political values. According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, in 2011–2016 the number of young people, those aged 14 to 34, has decreased from 30.4% to 27.8% of the total population. There is a considerable domination by the elderly group aged 30 to 34 which in 2016 recorded 3.5 million (Figure 3).

At the same year the group aged 25 to 29 constitutes about 3.4 million people. The five-year age group from 20 to 24–2.6 million, teenagers aged from 15 to 19 – almost 2 million. For the last four years one of the leading external causes of the men deaths aged from 18 to 34 has been “damage as a result of military action” on the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblast’s) under control of Russian military forces and pro-Russian separatists.

During the recent years, a steady depopulation is obvious in almost every age group, but the maximum rate of decrease is among youth people than among other age groups. These negative trends and the events of the past five years influenced on the change of value priorities of youth and the total population of Ukrainian society. According to the all-Ukrainian survey «Values of Ukrainian Youth–2016» conducted by Centre of Independent Sociological Research «OMEGA» for the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine most of all young people are concerned about the economic situation in the country – 63.3%, general decrease in living standards – 60% and employment – 52%, corruption and incompetence of government – 50.5%, and also military actions in East of Ukraine – 49.2% (Cinnosti ukrayinskoyi molodi, 2016, p. 11).

On the other side, according to the data of sociological monitoring conducted by Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine in the same period among the four groups of value priorities (security, self-realization, social comfort, democracy) significant positive rate changes had happened in the group of public values, while the dynamic of the rate security values had shown a decrease trend (Table 2).

Table 2. Dynamics of unified value groups among population of Ukraine and Ukrainian youth (weighted average scores according to the five-point rating scale)

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security &amp; Safety (vital values or basic human values)</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>4.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-realization (self-expression values)</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social comfort (pro-social values)</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.08*</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.88*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (democratic political and civic values)</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.81*</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.82**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: statistically significant differences of weighted average scores are shown between 2009 and 2014 (*– on the rate 5%, ** – on the rate 1%) (Cinnosti ukrayinskoyi molodi, 2016, p. 11).
According to a survey conducted in 2016 and on 11–24 July 2018 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Ukrainian Sociology Service company in cooperation with the Human Rights Information Centre and commissioned by UNDP, the most important values for adult Ukrainians are freedom, justice and security. From 2016 to 2018 the freedom rank rose-up and the rank of security decreased among the value priorities of Ukrainians (Figure 4).

**Figure 4.** (What Ukrainians Know, 2018, p.11)
Assessment of value priorities (%) (% of those who marked as the most important value)'

Note: The data does not include the temporarily occupied territory of Crimean Peninsula and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In some way the result shows that Ukrainians do not accept non-democratic governance and various forms of pressure from the government (What Ukrainians Know, 2018, p.11), hold as their ideal the notion of a truly democratic government but at the same time have a distinct outlook on politics and public policy.

Conclusions of the research. Dynamic changes, arising in the postmodern age, are characterized at the global level by transformation of traditional values and meanings both in private and in public spheres.

Public values, as well as political ones, are formed in specific historical conditions of the development of society, the needs and interests of the people, the place of the member and whole communities in certain economic, social and political relations (Kotovska, 2017).

From the other side, society as a nation or a state has its own set of social values, determined not only by the current political, social and economic conditions, but perhaps, above all, specific heritage – «cultural code», history of positioning itself as a community, a traditional relationships between its members and with other groups. The issue of values became particular important in Ukraine with the failure of the ideals of the Orange Revolution (2004). The culmination of this discourse of generation value shift became especially obvious on demonstration throughout Ukraine during November – December 2013 called Revolution of Dignity or «revolution of values» (Hrytsak Y., 2015), where the main initiators of protests against post-Soviet system of rules in politics and policy-making was the youth.

Generational value differences became noticeable in scientific research during the twentieth century and have been an impotent factor in politics and public policy in democratic countries. For example, the most concerning factor is the dramatic increase of youth unemployment in EU countries and the youth age group distance from public life (Generations using training, 2016, p. 2), which negatively influence the total sets of the relations in the society, public and political engagement, and decreased the positive transfer of norms and values between generations. The Ukrainian state has not only the problem of youth unemployment. Youth in Ukraine has clearly defined the difficult choices that confront it: stay in the country of birth or to leave it for more safe and convenient living place. The main objectives for contemporary Ukrainian government and society must be to send to the young generation strong messages and achieve positive reforms in order to enable the youth to believe in their future in Ukraine.

References
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ЦІННІСНІ ЗМІНИ ТА «РОЗРИВ ПОКОЛІНЬ»: ЇХ ВПЛИВ НА УЧАСТЬ МОЛОДІ У ПУБЛІЧНІЙ ПОЛІТИЦІ

Постановка проблеми. Сучасний світ характеризується швидкими змінами як на глобальному, так і на європейському, національному та місцевому рівнях, де одним із найважливіших факторів є демографічний. Люди не тільки живуть довше, але із значно більшою ймовірністю змінюють традиційні для їхніх батьків ідентичності, стилі життя, праці та відносин з іншими людьми.

Мета статті полягає в дослідженні впливу «розриву поколінь» на ціннісні зміни та сучасне ставлення різних поколінь до політики та публічної політики.

Виклад основного матеріалу. Ціннісні пріоритети окремо взятого народу є достатньо інертними і таким чином формують своєрідне ядро національного менталіту. Цінності в межах суспільства постійно трансформувалися через різні вікові когорти і впливають на формування «розриву поколінь», яке може призвести до різних революційних проявів. Молодь в Україні чітко усвідомлює перед собою складний вибір, який формується у важливу дилему: залишитися в країні свого народження або вибрати більш безпечне і зручне місце проживання поза її межами, де можливість отримати вищу зарплату значно більша.

Висновки. Головними завданнями сучасного українського уряду та суспільства є запропонувати молодому поколінню важливі для нього ідейні орієнтири та показати позитивні реформи. Без цілісної політики, спрямованої на соціальну інклюзію, включення молоді до суспільно-політичного життя, важко сподіватися на те, що молоде покоління буде зацікавлене залишитись в Україні.

Ключові слова: зміни цінностей, покоління, «розрив поколінь», молодь, публічна політика.

Матеріал надіслано 16 червня 2019 р.

Цитування:

Повна версія статті доступна також на сторінці:
http://zbirnyk-nadu.academy.gov.ua